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Summary:  
The global governance of trade is in a deadlock and the WTO is suffering from a long 
standing crisis of legitimacy. This is confirmed by the eventual failure of the Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations in 2011. This paper shows the connection between this crisis 
and the restructuring of world trade which has been going on for the last few decades, and 
which is set to continue. New emerging powers (China, India, etc.) are increasing their 
share of world trade which corresponds to new forms of globalization. This process calls for 
a reform of world trade governance, especially of the missions of WTO within a renovated 
economic world order. In order to identify the key channels through which international 
trade integration will impact the world economy, this paper presents four scenarios of world 
trade governance from now until 2030. 
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In the long term, world merchandise exports grow  almost  twice as quickly as world 
production. This  intensive and continuous opening up process of world economies goes 
together with a rapid restructuring of international trade over the last few decades (WTO, 
2008). At the same time, there is a striking discrepancy between these rapid changes and the 
difficulties met in adapting the governance of world trade, as it was designed in 1994 when 
forming the World Trade Organization.  
 
The Marrakech agreements forming the WTO marked the golden age of liberalism, when all 
countries converted to market economies and free trade. The spirit of the WTO was to apply a 
universal model of free trade to all developed and developing countries, and to all economic 
sectors. Following this model, the WTO has contributed to deepening and consolidating 
international trade liberalization since its inception. In this respect, the current crisis of the 
WTO is also the indicator of a more general crisis of global trade governance, which this 
paper seeks to analyze.  
 
Section 1 describes the ongoing trends of globalization in relation to trade, with a prospective 
view.  Section 2 analyses how and why the Doha cycle has failed, in relationship to the 
evolution of the world balance of power and of the respective roles of the State and markets. 
The decline of multilateralism and potential extension of regionalism which might result from 
the persistence of these difficulties in the next few years are analyzed in Section 2. Section 3 
reviews the challenges concerning the extension of the world trade regulation to new areas, 
such as to include human development, the link with finance, energy and environment. Last 
of all,  Section 4 presents four scenarios of world governance derived from the analysis 
conducted in this paper, focusing on trade regulation. 
 
 
1. Restructuring of world trade and new forms of globalization 
 
International trade has been changing deeply over the last decades. The most striking change 
is the growing world market share of China and, more generally, of big emerging countries, 
which will soon overtake industrialized countries of the Triad (USA, EU and Japan) following a 
declining trend. This restructuring went together with an increasing  globalization of 
manufacturing production within international value added chains, contributing to the rapid 
growth of both world and regional trade. 
 
The growing weight of emerging countries in world trade 
The ongoing geographic restructuring of world trade characterizes by a rapid growth of the 
share of China and a few emerging countries in world exports. Since 2009, China has become 
the first exporter of goods  & services in the world
1, its world market share increasing from 
3.6% in 2000 to 12.1% in 2010;
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1 The European Union remains the first world exporter if we consider it as one country and exclude 
intra-EU trade. 
  starting from a low level, India has doubled its world 
market share over the 2000s (table below).  
2  The market share for China indicated here is slightly different from the official WTO statistics, 
because Hong Kong is aggregated with China (whereas trade data for Hong Kong are still presented 
separately in WTO statistics). 3 
 
Table: Geographic restructuring of world trade 
Evolution of world market shares of leading exporters 2000-2030 (%) 
  Goods  Energy  Other 
primary  
Manuf. 
 
Services  TOTAL 
2000 
Developed  65,3  26,9  63,6  70,0  75,8  67,3 
European Union  39,1  17,2  37,9  41,9  46,5  40,5 
USA   13,0  2,2  13,1  14,3  19,7  14,3 
Japan  6,9  0,2  0,8  8,4  4,3  6,4 
Other developed  6,2  7,2  11,8  5,4  5,3  6,1 
Developing   34,7  73,1  36,4  30,0  24,2  32,7 
China  3,9  1,0  2,8  4,4  2,3  3,6 
India  0,7  0,2  1,1  0,7  1,1  0,8 
Other East Asia  4,5  4,9  6,4  4,3  2,8  4,2 
CIS  2,4  10,9  3,2  1,3  1,3  2,2 
West Asia  2,6  6,5  8,7  1,3  1,7  2,4 
South America  4,0  29,1  1,9  1,2  2,6  3,7 
Africa  2,4  12,8  4,0  1,0  2,2  2,4 
2010 
Developed  51,5  27,5  56,4  56,3  68,3  54,9 
European Union  34,5  16,3  35,3  38,7  46,2  36,9 
USA  8,5  3,5  9,9  9,4  14,8  9,8 
Japan  4,0  0,6  0,9  5,3  3,4  3,9 
Other developed  4,5  7,1  10,3  3,0  3,9  4,4 
Developing   48,5  72,5  43,6  43,7  31,7  45,1 
China  13,5  1,5  4,5  17,7  6,4  12,1 
India  1,4  1,4  1,7  1,4  2,7  1,7 
Other East Asia  4,4  4,8  8,1  3,8  3,0  4,1 
CIS  4,0  15,8  4,2  1,2  2,5  3,7 
West Asia  3,2  5,4  11,9  1,4  1,9  2,9 
South America  6,3  23,7  2,2  2,8  3,1  5,6 
Africa  3,2  11,7  4,6  1,0  2,5  3,1 
2030* 
Developed  43,1  28,7  46,6  46,5  54,4  45,1 
European Union  27,3  15,3  24,0  30,7  33,3  28,4 
USA   8,3  2,6  13,6  9,3  14,2  9,4 
Japan  3,5  0,9  1,8  4,3  3,4  3,5 
Other developed  4,0  9,9  7,2  2,2  3,5  3,9 
Developing   56,9  71,3  53,4  53,5  45,6  54,9 
China  19,5  4,5  14,6  23,8  14,0  18,5 
India  4,3  9,8  3,2  3,0  4,5  4,3 
Other East Asia  5,2  7,2  6,5  4,6  3,8  4,9 
CIS  3,6  15,9  2,9  0,5  3,1  3,5 
West Asia  4,2  6,8  13,0  2,7  3,1  4,0 
South America  4,9  9,4  2,2  4,0  3,8  4,7 
Africa  2,8  9,6  5,7  0,8  3,0  2,8 
Source: *Forecast=AUGUR Baseline scenario (Alphametrics, 2012). 4 
 
 
One can also underline South America’s performance, due especially but not only to Brazil, 
and Russia’s (together with neighbor ex-Soviet countries), thanks to the increase of energy 
price. Conversely, the share of industrialized countries in world exports is following a 
declining trend. Whereas the Triad countries made 61% of world exports in 2000, their share 
was reduced to 51% in 2010; the share of developed countries on the whole was reduced 
from 67% to 55% over the same period.  
 
Beyond this general trend, three stylized facts deserve to be noticed: 
 
-first of all, the emerging countries’ progress concerns a wide range of products; of course, 
export growth for manufactured products is spectacular and benefits from these countries’ 
comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods (garments, electronic products, etc.); but 
emerging countries are also improving their position quickly in agricultural products and food 
industries; this is especially the case in cereals, meat, sugar, etc. for Brazil (and Argentina to 
a lesser extent), two countries which have abundant fertile land resources (Pouch, 2012); the 
world market share of developing countries (China and India mostly) is also increasing for 
services; although the United States and other industrialized countries are still predominant 
in services exports, their share is also declining as it is for other products;  
 
-secondly, a very limited number of developing countries is benefitting from this trend, that is 
mostly China and India; over the last decades, developing countries’ exports have fluctuated 
because of the fluctuations of commodity prices, but the global market shares of developing 
regions (Africa, South America excluding Brazil, Asia excluding China) has remained pretty 
stable; especially, the market share of the Asian dragons and tigers has stagnated since the 
1997 Crisis (Vietnam being an exception); China’s remarkable performance has therefore 
been obtained partly to the detriment of Asian competitors, reflecting a well-known “crowding 
out” effect related to export-led growth strategies; 
 
-last of all, the geographic restructuring of trade has also concerned imports; the share of 
developing countries (China and India especially) in world imports has also increased 
massively, while the share of industrialized countries has declined; the growth of services 
imports by developing countries is however slower than their export growth, which 
corresponds to a reduction of their huge deficit for services; to sum it up, developing 
countries are becoming major players for exports but also as markets for all traded products. 
 
According to world forecasts conducted with the CAM model,
3
                                                           
3 These forecasts have been prepared for the EU AUGUR Project “Challenges for Europe in the world in 
2030“. The original version of this paper has also been prepared for this project. 
 these trends will continue over 
the next decades by 2030 (table). According to these forecasts, the combined world market 
share of China and India would reach almost 25% of the total; the  share  of developing 
countries would rise to 55% from 45% in 2010. The market share of developed countries 
would decrease to 45%, the EU being the main loser (almost -10 points), followed by the 
United States and Japan. The mediocre performance of the EU would result partly from a 
“structural effect” affecting its manufacturing exports (Stöllinger, 2012). On the whole period  
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(2000-2030) however, the EU and the USA would suffer from an equivalent decline of their world 
market share (around one third for each). 
 
These results are striking insomuch as China’s and India’s gains correspond approximately to 
the Triad countries’ losses. Following past trends, we expect the market share of other 
developed and developing countries to remain relatively stable. Such would be especially the 
case for the Community of Independent States (CIS), South America and for East Asian 
countries (excluding China and possibly Vietnam). These forecasts are globally consistent 
with forecasts made by the Asian Development Bank also for 2030, one difference being that 
the ADB study anticipates a gain in market share for ASEAN countries and for Latin America 
(Anderson & Strutt, 2011).  
 
 
New forms of globalization  
 
Geographical fragmentation of production speeds up the emergence of new actors in world 
trade, and more generally contributes to the growth of world trade. This is all the more so as 
different stages of production of one good, which were before located in one country only are 
now increasingly disseminated in various countries which are part to the “value chain”. This 
fragmentation process is fostered by the decrease of transport costs and by the development 
of new information and communication technologies, as well as by the continuous tariff 
reduction at the international level over the last few decades and massive Foreign Direct 
Investment flows. 
 
Within this new organization of labour defined as “trade in tasks”, “countries no longer export 
exclusively finished products but tend to specialize in specific stages of the production 
process” (WTO & IDE-JETRO,  2011). The concept of “International Production Networks” 
(IPNs) is also used to describe this process, the latter corresponds to an approach focusing 
more on the relationship between firms operating within the value chains rather than on the 
productive activities of the Global Value Chains (ARTNeT, 2011). The dynamism of intra-firm 
trade flows reflects the internationalization of value added chains: in the case of the United 
States, the only country for which direct data is available, 48% of imports and 30% of 
merchandise exports are considered to be intra-firm trade flows (Miroudot et al., 2010).  
 
Asia is the region the most advanced in the world concerning this fragmentation of production 
process, with a growing importance of vertical intra-industry trade and increased outsourcing 
especially for Japanese firms. If we adopt a value added content approach, estimates by 
OECD show that around 40% of the value of big Asian emerging countries’ exports (China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, etc.) corresponds to imported inputs, often from other Asian 
countries (Miroudot et al., 2010). Therefore, it is most difficult to evaluate properly the 
importance of bilateral trade. Over a few decades, the major US trade deficit with Japan has 
been replaced but a huge deficit with China, but this is partly an optical illusion as “usually it 
has been the last stage of the supply chain, the assembly of the final products, which has 
relocated to China, with the production of the core components remaining within the original 
country.”  Indeed, Chinese exports to the United States are grossly overestimated as it is 
clearly shown by the example of the I-phone: this product is exported for 200 USD a piece 6 
 
but only 5 USD of value added in China, the rest coming from Japan, other Asian countries, 
Europe and the USA (Miroudot, 2010).  
 
The growth of South-South trade derives partly from this process of regional division of 
labour (ADB, 2011). These elements help explain the increasing trade integration within the 
major world economic areas (Europe, North America, East Asia), and the need for countries 
belonging to these areas to sign regional trade agreements between themselves. This 
stimulates growth of trade in intermediate products: in 2009, trade in intermediate goods 
was the most dynamic sector of international trade, representing more than 50% of non-fuel 
world merchandise trade and 64% of the total imports of the Asia region (WTO & IDE-JETRO, 
ibidem). 
 
 
2.  Multilateralism and regionalism: complementary or alternative?   
 
The Marrakech Agreements of 1994 were largely biased towards industrialized countries and 
to a lesser extent towards big developing countries (Benaroya & Cling, 2001). They created 
the conditions for a deep North-South conflict which is still going on at the beginning of the 
2010s. The Doha Round had  also been named “Doha Development Agenda”, which 
recognized  this unbalance and the necessity to rebalance trade agreements in favor of 
developing countries on the whole. 
 
After several decades of trade liberalization limited to merchandise products, member 
countries  were  aiming within the Doha Round at continuing trade liberalization for these 
products but also at extending it to agricultural products and services, as they committed 
themselves to do when the WTO was started. Developing countries were  trying to take 
advantage of these negotiations to rebalance new agreements in their favor. As we show in 
this section, these combined objectives of increased trade liberalization and new North-South 
balance in a changing economic environment met with numerous obstacles, which explains 
the eventual failure of the negotiations. 
 
 
Difficulties to negotiate increased trade liberalization 
 
The WTO has changed the rule of the game for trade negotiations, by creating a set of 
multilateral trade rules, which all member countries have to apply. Indeed, during the second 
half of the 20
th
 
  century since the start of GATT, agreements were signed “à la carte” by 
voluntary countries while increased market access benefitted everybody, whether they signed 
the agreements or not, thanks to the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause. By adopting a single 
undertaking  approach, WTO obliges now all member countries to sign one single global 
agreement. At the same time, the WTO extends the scope of trade negotiations beyond 
industrial products. It covers all products (agricultural and industrial) and services, which are 
now potentially subject to trade liberalization. With this extended scope and with the new 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the WTO is now involved in defining national norms 
and regulations (e.g. imposing reform of investment laws, prohibiting export and production 
subsidies, etc.). This increased WTO power interferes with sovereignty of countries and 
reduces the leeway of government policies. 7 
 
 
This new ambition and power of the WTO has a drawback: WTO agreements have deeper 
implications and are therefore more difficult to obtain than before in the GATT framework, 
especially because of “single undertaking”  and of the bargaining process where all 
commitments require reciprocity from one another, whether in the same area or elsewhere. 
Furthermore, as the WTO is now almost universal (more than 150 members), it is almost 
impossible to come to a consensus on a global agreement respecting the above mentioned 
principles. This is why for services, which were the main focus of the Doha Round for 
industrialized countries, no formal reciprocity had been required and member countries only 
provided a list of qualitative commitments. The weakness of this alternative approach was 
that it did not provide many incentives for ambitious commitments. 
 
Another major problem is due to the players within the WTO and the trading system. In the 
WTO, the governments are negotiating on behalf of their national companies which they 
represent. This is consistent with the principles of international political economy as set out 
by Strange et al. (1991): international competition is not only between companies, but also 
between governments who defend the interests of their home companies. But, as underlined 
by Deblock (2010), this characteristic implies that rules and trade disciplines apply first to 
governments and to a lesser extent to companies. This is the reason why only governments 
can be prosecuted by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding and not companies. 
Competition rules and policies are a good example of this focus: competition policies only 
apply at the national level and there is no international cooperation in this field. 
 
Overall, there is an obvious contradiction between the continuous extension of the scope of 
the market and the narrow scope concerning trade rules, and therefore of trade distortions. 
The latter are essentially defined as discriminations towards foreign enterprises (=violation of 
national treatment) and between enterprises of different country origins (=violation of the 
MFN clause). In fact, the WTO mostly has an objective of trade liberalization and not of trade 
regulation. But trade distortions can be of many other sorts. Let’s just think of trade 
negotiators endlessly arguing about lowering tariffs on industrial products by a few points, 
while the USA are accusing China of undervaluing their currency by more than 20%! 
 
 
Linking globalization and development 
 
Over the last few decades, developing countries conducted active trade liberalization policies, 
which went together (contrary to standard economic theory) with diverging trends between 
developing and developed countries’ growth paths (with a few exceptions such as China and a 
few emerging Asian countries). Special and differential treatment (SDT) granted within GATT 
tried to compensate development levels asymmetries and to reduce this divergence. But the 
single undertaking has forced all countries into a “one size fits all” model, whatever their 
development level, thereby strongly reducing or even abandoning SDT. Meanwhile, trade 
preferences granted to developing countries on a unilateral basis have been eroded by the 
multilateral liberalization process.  
 
Linking globalization and development means making trade agreements more development 
friendly. It requires an increased SDT reversing the WTO agreements of 1994, which must be 
accepted by industrialized countries facing acute economic difficulties following the world  8 
 
 
financial crisis. According to Bhagwati & Sutherland (2011): “ this assumption –  that a 
development friendly trade deal must demand less of countries in a way that is proportionate 
to their state of development – permeates the Doha Round and the final package will rightly 
have to be measured against it”. 
 
On the one hand, the Doha Round (also entitled “Development Round”) included asymmetric 
commitments between developed and developing countries concerning the depth of tariff 
reductions and of reductions in agricultural subsidies (and potentially for the use of safeguard 
measures). For all developing countries, and especially for LDCs (cotton), removing 
distortions to trade caused by European and American agricultural subsidies is also a major 
issue, as these subsidies tend to push world prices of these products downward. But 
developing countries should still be allowed some sort of agricultural subsidies.  
 
On the other hand, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) were  totally exempted from tariff 
reductions in the Doha Round ("Round for free”). The rationale was to compensate for the 
fact that LDCs are widely considered to be the main losers for the Marrakech agreements, but 
they would also have been from the Doha Round, as far as tariff reductions are concerned 
(especially through the erosion of trade preferences). In order to go further, LDCs should be 
granted a duty free access to the OECD markets, which was planned in the negotiations
4
 
. 
One of the main problems raised by this new approach (or, should we say by the return to 
the traditional approach) is due to the increasing differentiation between developing 
countries. This problem is now becoming very acute as China has become the first world 
exporter and as other big emerging countries are becoming major players in world trade. 
How could we keep granting them the same preferences and derogations as to smaller or less 
developed countries? This is one of the main difficulties met by multilateral  trade 
negotiations, knowing that big emerging countries refuse any differentiation between 
developing countries, which would reduce their benefits. This difficulty is also met in other 
multilateral negotiations such as the ones on climate & environment.  
 
 
Contradictions between historic capitalisms and emerging capitalisms 
 
A last major difficulty met by the multilateral trade framework concerns the difficulty to 
regulate a trading system where some very heterogeneous economic and development 
models coexist. To make it simple, one can define industrialized countries (or OECD 
countries) as capitalist economies with low demographic growth and low saving rates; but 
China and Vietnam for example have economies which qualify themselves as “socialist market 
economies” (which is also the case of India which is a market economy). In spite of their 
demographic transition, these countries have strong saving rates  because of their 
demographic structure and still low dependency ratios, which is one of the causes of current 
trade and financial imbalances. They are also often opposed to further economic liberalization 
due to their economic and political situation. Let’s not forget that China and Vietnam are 
among the last countries worldwide to keep adopting and implementing five-year economic 
plans.  
 
To sum it up, even if these countries have adopted market economy principles and have 
accessed WTO,  government policies and companies keep playing an important role in the 
economy. This is the reason why China and Vietnam have accessed WTO as Non Market  
                                                           
4The European Union has been granting duty free access to LDCs since 2001 (“Everything but Arms” 
Initiative). However, in practice many products do not benefit from this duty free access. The same 
with the USA, who grant duty free access to LDCs subject to many restrictions (and excluding some of 
them).  9 
 
 
Economies. This specific status allows other member countries to protect their market better 
against Chinese and Vietnamese products, and especially to implement antidumping 
measures almost at their will against these products.  
 
The conflict on services at WTO can partly be explained by these differences. On the one 
hand, the USA – which is the first world exporter of services – plays a very active role and 
seeks an improved access to international markets. On the other hand, big emerging 
countries (Brasil, China and India especially) fear the opening of their market, which would 
make their national champions compete with American multinationals. The difficulty for China 
to sign the plurilateral agreement on public procurement, which the USA are pressing, can be 
explained by the same reasons. 
 
 
New regional agreements 
 
The current dead end at WTO does not mean that the trade liberalization process has been 
interrupted at the international level. In fact, it keeps progressing within regional and 
bilateral agreements. Following the failure of the Doha Round, the multilateral liberalization 
process might be interrupted for a few years, and conversely increased regionalism might 
occur.  
 
Regionalism and its link with multilateralism is an old issue. The debate about its contribution 
to reinforcing the multilateral system or to weakening it has been going on for years, and the 
jury is still out about the question:  “stepping stone or stumbling block?”  The increased 
regionalization process in the recent past is a recognized fact and reinforces this debate. 
Trade between neighbours keeps increasing : according to Krugman (2008), the value of the 
distance coefficient has doubled in gravity models since 1960. At the same time, trade 
agreements are signed between these countries to increase trade but also between distant 
countries (such as North-South regional agreements). 
 
Over the last two decades, most of trade liberalization has been observed not at the WTO but 
within regional and bilateral trade agreements. The main agreements signed since 1990 are: 
NAFTA (1994); Mercosur (1995); the Euromed agreements, which came into force from 1998 
(with Tunisia), EU-Mexico free trade agreement (2000) and the ASEAN+China free trade 
agreement (2010).  
 
Of course, WTO (2011) underlines that intra-regional trade (excluding intra-EU trade) only 
represents 16% of world trade. But this is a growing share and some new regional trade 
agreements might increase this share further in the medium term. Such would be the case if 
a transatlantic free trade agreement is signed between the EU and the USA, and potentially 
also between the EU and Japan. 
 
Also, we can notice that the main innovation brought about by the Doha Round for industrial 
products concerned  signing sector free trade agreements “à la carte” between voluntary 
members. These agreements drew from the two sector agreements of this  kind signed in 
1994 (chemical products and NTIC), and went further in terms of trade liberalization. Among 
14 potential agreements, for half of them (chemical, electric & electronic products, industrial 
machinery) the potential signatories represented a major share of world trade. Other sectors  10 
 
 
(such as textile & clothing) might have be concerned by these agreements later on, which is 
important to take into account into our prospective exercise. 
 
The major change concerning regional trade integration is that regional agreements are not 
so much about trade preferences anymore (especially as MFN tariffs have declined 
substantially), but increasingly about non tariff barriers and national regulations. A good 
example is shown by the USA-Korea bilateral free trade agreement signed in 2010, which 
includes mutual validation of technical regulations for cars. More often, the change of 
regulations provoked by such agreements concerns all trading partners and not just the 
participants to the regional agreements. Because of this, regional agreements are redesigning 
the international normative framework, which could then influence the multilateral 
framework. 
 
However, regional agreements benefit mostly big countries, which are in a very powerful 
position to impose their agenda in bilateral relations; on the contrary, small countries are 
confronted with an alternative: either they accept regional/bilateral agreements where their 
bargaining power is limited; or they are excluded from such agreements and left alone. 
 
Whatever the case may be, signing regional agreements tends to reduce the motivation of 
the big players to reach an agreement at the WTO. Thus, increased regionalism is both a 
“stepping stone” and a “stumbling block” in relation to the multilateral trading framework. As 
the WTO is concerned however, this trend undoubtedly reduces its influence, and might even 
threaten its survival as a major international organization following the failure of the Doha 
Round.   
 
 
 
3. The need to widen the scope of trade governance 
 
Even if the WTO survives the failure of the Doha Round and if some of the anti-globalization 
organizations which want to close it down do not succeed, the need for reform has become 
stronger. But this question should be replaced in a more general debate around the reform of 
the architecture of the economic and financial world governance. Indeed, the world economic 
crisis has both deepened the legitimacy crisis of the international institutions in charge of 
world economic governance (mainly WTO, IMF and World Bank) and called for reinforcement 
of these institutions. Up to now, a “new Bretton Woods” which was talked about at the 
beginning of the crisis has not taken place, but the need for it is as acute as ever
5
 
.  
In this section, we analyze the challenges of reforming the international economic 
institutions, limiting ourselves to the interactions between a “bigger” WTO, the United Nations 
and other international institutions such as the IMF. We promote an enlargement of the 
missions of the WTO, which should also be fully integrated into the UN system and explicitely  
                                                           
5 Let’s remind the reader that the Bretton Woods Conference (1944) decided to create the IMF and the 
World Bank, as well as the International Trade Organization. The latter took 50 more years to start, 
due to the opposition of the United States who refused for several decades to put in place a powerful 
multilateral trading framework. 
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link trade and human development. Following Mattoo & Subramanian (2009), we also suggest 
three areas which deserve a better articulation with trade: finance; energy and environment. 
 
 
Trade and human development 
 
The main objective of WTO is to promote free trade. According to article 1 of the WTO 
Agreement, member countries consider that “their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, 
and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services”. (WTO, 1994)  This mission 
is more restricted than the one which was assigned to the International Trade Organization 
by the Havana Charter. The latter also referred to the objective of expanding production and 
trade, but also included a wider objective of “realizing the aims set forth in the Charter of the 
United Nations, particularly the attainment of the higher standards of living, full employment 
and conditions of economic and social progress and development  (…)”  (United Nations, 
1948).  
 
The  improvement of wages and working conditions (“as productivity may permit”) was a 
central objective of the Havana Charter, which fully acknowledged interaction between trade 
and labour standards in the name of “fair trade”. This implied strong collaboration with the 
International Labour Organization, an objective which has completely disappeared in the WTO 
(partly because of the developing countries themselves which feared the adoption of a “social 
clause”). 
 
In the WTO articles, the reference to the UN Charter has disappeared. This means first that 
WTO has been designed as an international organization out of the UN system. Even the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and IMF) which are largely independent from the UN 
refer to the UN Charter. This makes the WTO the only major international organization which 
does not refer to the UN principles. This especially implies that the WTO does neither comply 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights not with the UN Declaration of Economic and 
Social Rights.  As Supiot (2010) underlines it, this corresponds to placing the market first 
before all other general objectives of human development (even if the objective of full 
employment and increasing standards of living is formally mentioned in article 1). 
 
This regression is particularly obvious concerning the interest for development. The Havana 
Charter was very ambitious in this respect as it was assigned the objective “to foster and 
assist industrial and general economic development, particularly of those countries which are 
still in the early stages of industrial development”. The WTO is much more modest as it only 
aims to “secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of 
their economic development”.  As mentioned before, the Marrakech Agreements are very 
biased against developing countries, which is consistent with this lack of interest for 
development.  
  
To sum it up, the only way to solve the legitimacy crisis of WTO and to reinforce the power of 
this organization is to enlarge its scope while including it more narrowly in the United Nations 
system. A reform of its governance should take place simultaneously, in order to increase the 
voice of developing countries.  
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Linking trade and finance 
 
“Inappropriate” levels of exchange rates are considered to be among the main economic 
distortions affecting international trade. However, as mentioned above, it is surprising that 
the WTO focuses on tariffs which increase the price of imported products, whereas overvalued 
exchange rates tend to do the same (or on the contrary). For historical reasons, the IMF is 
supposed to be the only one in charge of monitoring exchange rates but this mission is only 
partly fulfilled. To take again the example of the supposed undervaluation of the Chinese 
Yuan, the fact that the WTO has no right to discuss this source of distortion is a real problem, 
if we consider the huge growth of Chinese exports over the last few years. Up to now, only 
unilateral measures have been discussed such as « anti-dumping » measures which are 
supposed to be used for other purposes. Better coordination in this field would be huge 
progress as far as the regulation of the world economy is concerned. It could be supported by 
the WTO Dispute Settlement system, using the comparative advantages of each organization. 
 
More generally, linking financial liberalization and the WTO raises a problem of global 
governance: the international crisis confirmed the danger of liberalization of finance without 
proper regulation. After this major crisis (which is not over yet), there exists an obvious 
contradiction between keeping liberalizing finance at the WTO within GATS and the necessary 
reinforcement of international financial regulation. This especially calls for increased 
coordination between WTO, IMF, IBS and IFB. 
 
 
Regulating the price of commodities 
 
The Havana Charter (1947), which was supposed to define the mandate of the International 
Trade Organization, proposed to improve trade regulation, with the objective to remove all 
sorts of distortions to trade (wage costs, price of commodities, etc.). Contrary to this, the 
WTO has no mission to regulate the price of commodities. This decision is mainly due to 
ideological reasons (the WTO is supposed to liberalize trade and not to regulate it). But one 
has to recognize that all the attempts to regulate the price of commodities for the last half 
century have failed (except for oil), which is both due to technical difficulties and to the 
opposition of the USA, who have achieved in making disappear all existing systems (see the 
example of coffee in the 1990s). This lack of regulation increases the volatility of prices, and 
is detrimental to producers (often developing countries) and to consumers overall.  
 
Following the world economic crisis, this need for regulation is more pressing, especially as 
far as food security is concerned. The important increase in food prices is mainly due to the 
bio-energy policies conducted in industrialized countries, according to a World Bank study 
quoted by Mattoo and Subramanian (ibidem). These policies tend to reduce the offer of food 
products for consumption. In the long term, economists anticipate high prices for food 
products because of several factors: high price of energy; slow productivity gains in 
agriculture; pressure on production because of climate change. In this context, trade policies 
(and the WTO) should play a major role. 
 
In the case of oil where OPEC has been a huge success, the cartel tends to increase prices 
well over their competitive market price. This problem is very acute for the world economy as 
oil is both the main traded commodity and the one for which competition distortions are the 
highest due to the very powerful price control exerted by OPEC. Better regulation of the world 
oil markets and prices would require starting an international institution where producers and 
consumers would meet, or widening the mandate of WTO. 
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Trade and environment 
 
The WTO has no formal mandate to deal with the environment. However, the preamble of the 
WTO agreement establishing the organization states that “…relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to (…) expanding the production of and 
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment”. The preamble also refers to the Rio Declaration on environment 
and development (1992).  
 
Referring to this preamble, several decisions made by the DSU have started designing 
common law in this field. These decisions were made following complaints by member 
countries against other countries restricting imports for environmental reasons 
(shrimp/tortoise case USA vs Thailand; tires Brasil vs EU, etc.).  
 
Because there is no International Environment Organization, there is a risk that big countries 
might use trade sanctions for protectionist purposes in order to restrict imports from 
developing countries. The same worry has been expressed by developing countries 
concerning the introduction into the WTO of other subjects such as social standards (the so-
called “social clause”). In fact, we agree with Mattoo & Subramanian that such sanctions 
should not aim at forcing countries to cooperate in this field but should be restricted to 
incentives to enforcement of international agreements on environment and climate change 
(the same proposal could be made concerning social standards adopted by ILO).  
 
Beyond the technical aspects (« who should do what and how ? »), the purpose of these 
reforms would be to enlarge the scope of the WTO (or of other organizations working in 
coordination with the WTO) which would not be restricted to trade liberalization but which 
would include wider subjects connected to the regulation of international trade, working with 
the Bretton Woods institutions on these subjects. Of course, such an enlargement would 
require institutional reform, which is not the subject of this paper.  
 
 
4. Four macro-economic scenarios for international trade and trade liberalization 
  
The four scenarios presented in this section correspond to different anticipated evolutions of 
the world economy and therefore of world trade. Four key issues distinguish these scenarios 
concerning the articulation of trade policies and the governance of world trade: the respective 
weight of governments and of international regulation versus markets; the balance between 
the industrialized and developing countries within the multilateral trading system; the 
possibility of reaching better coordination between countries at the world level or rather at 
the regional level; the size of international financial and trade imbalances, where the 
China/USA relationship plays a role which is not exclusive. In the analysis conducted here, 
the European Union does not play a major role in contributing to the probability of 
implementation of these different scenarios. Even more, it is projected to be a slow growth 
area (at last during all the 2010s) following the Euro crisis, with bleak export growth 
prospects. 
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Reduced government 
 
In this first scenario reduction of government spending is implemented. Also, the process of 
trade liberalization goes on during the next decades (this  also implies further financial 
liberalization). We hypothesize that a new multilateral agreement is signed at the WTO in the 
next few years, which means going towards zero tariffs on most industrial goods which also 
means generalized free trade for these products and the conclusion of a long process started 
in the middle of the last century.  
 
The real remaining challenges concern agricultural products and services. For agricultural 
products, further liberalization (reduction of tariffs and removal of subsidies) mostly benefits 
developed countries and big emerging countries but increases the vulnerability of other 
developing countries. The price increase due to trade liberalization should be limited except 
for cotton where the reduction of American subsidies and the production price increase will 
benefit African countries.  
 
This option means that the WTO is going to potentially liberalize most services in the long 
term. Following a liberal globalization path will stimulate foreign direct investment with the 
perspective of signing a multilateral agreement on investment (which was refused by 
developing countries and by anti-globalization protesters at the end of the 1990s). This 
investment surge will contribute to location shifts of global industries. 
 
In this scenario, the WTO will limit itself to organizing the trade liberalization process and a 
smooth free trade respecting multilateral agreements, using the DSU.  This “universal 
Washington consensus”  corresponds basically to following recent trends: for international 
trade. This scenario is considered as our baseline scenario, with projected market shares 
presented in the table at the beginning of this paper. As recalled before, this anticipates a 
continuing declining trend of the share of developed countries (especially EU, but also USA 
and Japan) in world trade going together with a growing share of developing countries 
(especially China and  India). A reduction of international trade and financial imbalances 
(reduction of US debt especially)  is also anticipated; no catching up by other developing 
countries is expected.  
 
 
China and US hegemony 
 
This scenario is based on the hypothesis of increased coordination between China and the 
USA (trade, finance, environment, etc.), who impose their leadership on other countries. In 
this scenario, government interventions are increased.  
 
Concerning trade policies which are our main focus in this paper, this scenario is consistent 
with the current situation where the two major players at WTO are the USA and China. Their 
conflict went as far as having a major contribution to leading the Doha Round to a dead end. 
So we presume that the USA and China will remain the dominant players but also that they 
will come to an agreement of mutual benefit in the short to medium term. This situation could 
be justified by two major reasons: 
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-first of all, the EU (which is the first world exporter, even excluding intra-EU trade) is rather 
taking a back seat in current debates, which reflects the difficulties encountered for designing 
European policies in general; because of lack of consensus between EU countries on shared 
objectives and principles, the EU is mainly taking  a defensive stance (on agriculture 
especially); European liberalization policies are therefore significantly unilateral, especially in 
the services sector without getting any reciprocity at WTO (Mazier, 2005a et 2005b); 
 
-second, the mercantilist (or “commercialist” according to Deblock, 2010) logic of WTO and 
not taking into account strategic alliances, it is normal that the two main world traders (apart 
from EU, see above) should be the two main players of multilateral negotiations as they are 
negotiating reciprocal opening of their markets.  
 
This scenario corresponds to a contradictory process of further trade liberalization on the one 
hand and of progress of world regulation on the other hand: this better world regulation 
(dominated by the USA and China) implies improved monetary cooperation (reevaluation of 
the Yuan parity) as well as better regulation for energy (stabilization of oil prices) and a 
reduction of trade and financial imbalances (this reduction process has already started 
following the world crisis). The USA and China benefit from their joint hegemony, especially in 
terms of international trade: China almost doubles its share of world exports of goods & 
services by 2030 compared to 2010.  
 
 
Regionalisation 
 
While it is becoming increasingly difficult to adopt new global norms at the international level 
due to diverging objectives followed  by the main players, globalisation of business and 
markets oblige national governments in each part of the world to undertake important new 
initiatives at the regional level in order to spur economic growth (Alphametrics, 2012).   
 
Following the failure of the Doha Round, and if there is no turn towards stronger government 
policies, one can expect a certain weakening of WTO in the next few years (if it is not 
reformed, which is the condition for reinforcing the influence of this organization). Trade 
liberalization and the growth of international trade can then go on, but at a regional level, 
following past trends described above.  
 
This process goes on with a reinforcement of regional trade agreements, which multiplied 
during the last decades, especially since the 1990s (see above). According to Bhagwati & 
Sutherland (2011), “For the time being, the momentum is behind the RTA [Regional Trade 
Areas/NDA] solution”.  
 
The main free trade agreement which remains to be signed is the transatlantic agreement 
signed between the EU and the USA, which are the two major economic powers. The 
signature of a free trade agreement within APEC (USA, Japan, China and other countries 
bordering the Pacific Ocean) would be an alternative to the transatlantic agreement. This vast 
free trade area would stimulate exports by China and BRICs of their value chains (Baghwati & 
Sutherland, 2011).  
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Stronger regional integration implies better coordination of exchange rates at the regional 
level (Asia, Europe, etc.), which especially implies that the Euro zone will not disappear. It 
also implies higher trade performance (both exports and imports) for the European Union, the 
USA and China especially due to increased intra-regional trade. But no reduction in 
international imbalances will occur, as regional integration means reorientation of trade and 
financial flows but still basically the same growth model for the main economic players.  
 
 
Multipolar collaboration 
  
Increased regulation of the world economy and stronger cooperation policies will improve 
economic convergence between countries, and benefit low income countries which will posit 
faster economic growth. Better coordination on environmental issues is also expected leading 
to more environmentally friendly world growth (with less carbon emissions). 
 
Concerning trade issues, this implies an interruption of the trade liberalization process from 
now on, but without an increase of tariffs or trade protections (no such protectionist back-
turn has occurred even during the international crisis).  A reform of the WTO could go along a 
wider reform of international economic governance, within a “new Bretton Woods”.  The need 
for a reform of the WTO is increased by the failure of the Doha Round, which expresses the 
deadlock of “single undertaking”, the opposition to further worldwide liberalization for all 
products and the preference for adopting new regulations.   
 
This “rosy” scenario correspond to the highest anticipated economic and trade growth at the 
world level. A slower restructuring of the world trade is also anticipated, with better 
performance of developed countries and a slightly worse performance of developing countries 
(Asian countries especially). Two main trade issues relevant to this scenario should be solved:  
 
-  enlarging the scope of trade regulations (whether within the WTO or other ad hoc  new 
international organizations); this covers better regulation of energy and commodities markets 
which will support better incomes for producer countries (this means that the oil price will 
remain controlled by OPEC with improving market mechanisms)  and taking into account 
environmental issues; also needed is a better coordination between trade and exchange rate 
policies, which means joint work of WTO and IMF; last of all, taking into account the 
relationship between trade and environment (and potentially social standards); 
 
-rebalancing the international trading system towards developing countries  and human 
development implies increasing asymmetries at the WTO (SDT, etc.) and also balancing the 
DSU  towards poor countries, which need to be able to lodge complaints and to see the 
decisions applied quickly (this means adopting financial sanctions for example); 
 
This scenario also means an improvement of the international monetary system and a 
reduction of international trade and financial imbalances (including a rebalanced Chinese 
growth model). We anticipate stronger capital flows received by developing countries on the 
whole and, as in the previous scenario an increased role of the Yuan among international 
currencies, next to the dollar and euro. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzed new forms of trade globalization observed over the last few decades, 
which included fast growth of world trade going together with a deep geographic and sector 
restructuring and increased regionalization, leading to a new international division of labour. 
Our analysis also delved on the long standing crisis of the governance of world trade, which 
culminated with the failure of the Doha Round after ten years of multilateral negotiations. The 
paper eventually drew some perspectives for reform, and connected them with different 
scenarios for the world economy. We can draw an important lesson from these scenarios: 
although the main trends of restructuring of world trade are set to continue, especially the 
decline of developed countries and the growing weight of developing countries, policy options 
will influence these evolutions and will nuance these trends. 
 
The international crisis which started in 2008 increased the questioning of the international 
economic architecture on the whole, although this has not provoked any substantive reform 
at the time of writing, apart from purely “cosmetic changes”. But it is more important than 
ever to understand, which this paper tries to justify, that current characteristics of world 
governance (trade, finance, environment, etc.) reflect choices of society. Therefore, the 
evolution of international power relationships and decisions made on world governance will 
have a major influence on the paths followed by the world economy in the medium term. 
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